



Intelligence Information Cable

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CITE [REDACTED] (b)(3)

DIST 23 SEPTEMBER 1970

COUNTRY ISRAEL

DOI [REDACTED]

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SUBJECT ATTITUDES OF ARABS IN ISRAELI-OCCUPIED AREAS REGARDING ~~RENOVATION~~
 IN JORDAN.

BEHR
 BERGSTEN (b)(1)
 CHAPIN (b)(3)
 HOLDRIDGE
 LEHMAN
 LORD/RODMAN
 LYNN
 MORRIS
 OSGOOD (b)(1)
 ROBINSON (b)(3)
 SANDERS (b)(1)
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ACQ [REDACTED]

FIELD NO.

SOURCE [REDACTED]

SUMMARY. THE ARAB COMMUNITY IN ISRAELI-OCCUPIED TERRITORY IS VIRTUALLY UNANIMOUS IN ITS HOSTILITY TO THE DECISION BY KING HUSAYN TO PACIFY JORDAN BY FORCE. WHILE THERE IS GENERAL OPPOSITION WITHIN THIS COMMUNITY TO A RETURN TO THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE WHICH EXISTED BEFORE THE SIX-DAY WAR, THERE REMAIN WIDELY DIVERGENT VIEWS ON POLITICAL ALTERNATIVES. END OF SUMMARY.

1. KING HUSAYN'S EFFORTS TO RE-ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER JORDAN.

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BY MILITARY MEANS HAVE RECEIVED VIRTUALLY NO SUPPORT AMONG ARABS IN ISRAELI-OCCUPIED AREAS. ARABS WHO CONSIDER THEMSELVES "PALESTINIANS", WHILE NOT NECESSARILY SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF EXTREMIST ARAB ORGANIZATIONS, TEND NATURALLY TO OPPOSE THE BEDOUIN-BASED GOVERNMENT OF KING HUSAYN. THEY HAVE BEEN JOINED, HOWEVER, BY MAYORS AND OTHER LEADERS WHO ESSENTIALLY BELONG TO THE POLITICAL FAMILY OF KING HUSAYN, IN HOSTILITY TO THE WANTON SLAUGHTER WHICH IS REPORTED TO BE TAKING PLACE IN JORDAN. MOST HAVE RELATIVES AND ASSOCIATES IN JORDAN. THERE IS GREAT CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF THESE PEOPLE. MORALE IS LOW AND THE ARAB COMMUNITY VIEWS THE FUTURE WITH FOREBODING.

2. ALTHOUGH THERE SEEMS TO BE RELATIVE UNANIMITY IN OPPOSITION TO KING HUSAYN AND HIS RECENT TACTICS WITH THE ARAB COMMUNITY CONCERNING ALTERNATIVES, A GENERAL CONVICTION EXISTS THAT THERE CAN BE NO SETTLEMENT WHICH RETURNS THE AREAS TO THE POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS THAT EXISTED BEFORE JUNE 1967. THE FOLLOWING AND OTHER VIEWPOINTS ARE FREQUENTLY HEARD:

A. AMONG PALESTINIANS THERE IS STRONG ADVOCACY OF A PALESTINIAN STATE WHICH PERMITS SOME SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP FOR THE HASHEMITES AND BEDOUINS.

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B. OTHERS ARGUE FOR AN AUTONOMOUS AREA WITHIN THE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, GIVING SPECIAL TIES TO THE PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS.

C. SOME ARABS, ESPECIALLY IN JERUSALEM AND THE SOUTH WANT SOME FORM OF AUTONOMOUS STATUS WHICH PERMITS CONTINUING RELATIONSHIPS, ESPECIALLY ECONOMIC, WITH ISRAEL.

D. GAZA INHABITANTS WANT NEITHER EGYPTIAN NOR ISRAELI CONTROL. THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO LEADERSHIP LEFT IN GAZA, LARGELY AS A RESULT OF HARSH EGYPTIAN MEASURES AGAINST TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP ELEMENTS. WHAT LITTLE OPINION IS ARTICULATED TENDS TO BE HIGHLY UNREALISTIC. SOME FORM OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTORATE IS OCCASIONALLY ADVOCATED. MANY OF THE SIMPLE WORKERS WHO ARE EMPLOYED WITHIN ISRAEL WANT SIMPLY TO OBTAIN ISRAELI CITIZENSHIP.

E. SURPRISINGLY, AMONG SOME BUSINESSMEN AND WORKERS, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF THE RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL ARE SO SUBSTANTIAL THAT THERE IS QUITE AN ADVOCACY FOR INCORPORATION INTO ISRAEL WITHOUT CONCERN FOR VISIONS OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE.

3. THE FOREGOING DISPARATE VIEWS FIND EXPRESSION AMONG ARAB LEADERS AS FOLLOWS:

A. ANWAR NUSAYBIH, FORMER JORDANIAN DEFENSE MINISTER AND

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AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED KINGDOM, WISHES TO SEE THE WEST BANK REINCORPORATED INTO JORDAN BUT WITH CLEAR AUTONOMY FOR PALESTINE.

B. AHMAD TUQAN, FORMER JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, IS INSISTENT THAT THE HASHEMITES SHOULD HAVE NO CONTROL OVER THE WEST BANK.

C. THE MAYORS OF QUALQIYA, TULKARM, AND JENIN ADVOCATE INCORPORATION OF THE WEST BANK INTO ISRAEL.

D. THE MAYORS OF GAZA AND AL BUREIJ ARE SUPPORTERS OF YASIR ARAFAT AND SUPPORT THE FATAH PROGRAM FOR AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE.

4. [REDACTED] FROM THE FOREGOING WEI (b)(1)
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OF VIEWS, THERE EMERGES CLEAR ANTAGONISM TO THE HASHEMITE HOUSE OF JORDAN AND A LESS INSISTENT ADVOCACY FOR CONTINUATION OF THE PROFITABLE ECONOMIC TIES WITH ISRAEL. BEYOND THAT THE ARAB COMMUNITY REMAINS DEEPLY DIVIDED.

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: CINCMEAFSA.

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